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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VELMA GLADYS YATES, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
VERNAL FAMILY HEALTH CENTER, 
a Project of the Division of 
Family and Community Medi-
cine, University of Utah; 
UINTAH COUNTY; UINTAH COUNTY 
HOSPITAL; VERNAL DRUG COM-
PANY, a Utah Corporation; 
and GORDON LEE BALKA, M.D., 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
Case No. 16602 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS UINTAH COUNTY 
AND UINTAH COUNTY HOSPITAL 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was commenced by Plaintiff against Defendants 
alleging injuries sustained as a result of various acts of 
health care malpractice. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
After extensive briefing by all parties the Honorable Allen 
B. Sorenson granted the motions of Uintah County and Uintah Coun-
ty Hospital for dismissal based upon the failure of Plaintiff 
to comply with the requirements of Section 78-14-8, U.C.A., 
Section 17-15-10, U.C.A. and Section 63-30-13, U.C.A. (R., p. 
2 20) . 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants Uintah County and Uintah County Hospital seek 
affirmance of the lower court's Order of Dismissal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's "Statement of the Facts" erroneously implies 
that facts alleged by Plaintiff in her complaint are in fact 
true. In addition, Plaintiff fails to state certain critical 
procedural facts necessary for determination of this appeal. 
For these reasons, the following factual statement is offered 
by Respondents Uintah County and Uintah County Hospital. 
It is undisputed that during certain periods of time be-
tween December, 1975 and March, 1977 Plaintiff received medi-
cal care or medical supplies from the various defendants. It 
is also undisputed that Plaintiff's first contact with Respon-
dent Uintah County Hospital occurred on March 12, 1977, the 
date of her first hospitalization. She subsequently received 
medical care at the facility for a short period of time, was 
later readmitted for approximately one week and was finally 
discharged on April 12, 1977. 
Plaintiff has alleged that in March of 1978 it was disco-
vered that Plaintiff suffered permanent mental disability be-
cause of the claimed negligence of the various defendants. (R.' 
p. 3). 
On April 7, 1978 the following letter was prepared and 
served upon the four addressees: 
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April 7, 1978 
TO: 
Gentlemen: 
Vernal Family Health Center 
Dr. Lee Balka 
Vernal Drug Company 
Uintah County Hospital 
Pursuant to 78-14-8 UCA, notice is herewith given that 
Marzine Yates, husband of Velma Gladys Yates, potentially is 
asserting and claiming and may commence a civil action for 
damages arising out of possible negligent prescribing, negli-
gent dispensing of drugs or other forms of prescribed medi-
cine, and negligent hospitalization and treatment of his wife. 
In compliance with the aforesaid section of the Utah Code, it 
is believed and will be alleged in the event a civil action is 
commenced that from approximately March, 1976 until March, 
1978, claimant's wife received prescriptions from the Vernal 
Drug Company believed to have been prescribed by Dr. Lee Balka 
in his official capacity as a partner or responsible agent of 
the Vernal Family Health Center, which prescriptions, in com-
bination of use or seperate, were dispensed in an excessive 
amount which has resulted in permanent mental damage to claim-
ant's wife. It is further believed that as a result of the 
prolonged excess abuse of the prescription medication, the 
seizure and subsequent coma which claimant's wife suffered 
approximately one year ago were possibly the result of negli-
gence. 
Claimant is unable to supply further information about 
the details of the possible claim or the possible believed re-
sponsible parties until an exam of all the books and records 
of recipients of this notice has been accomplished. 
s/ 
Marzine Yates 
s/ 
Robert M. McRae 
Attorney for Claimant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me on this 7th day of April, 
1978. 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
No notice of claim in any form was ever filed with the 
Uintah County Commissioners. In addition, no notice of claim 
has ever been filed with the Uintah County Auditor. (R., p. 
203). 
On July 19, 1978 Plaintiff filed a complaint with the 
Uintah County Clerk's Office alleging various acts of malprac-
tice by Defendants. (R., pp. 1-3). All defendants filed an-
swers to this Complaint and all moved for dismissal based upon 
Plaintiff's failure to comply with various provisions of Utah 
statutory law. 
Although some of the arguments advanced by the defendants 
were common to all defendants, other claims were peculiar to 
each defendant because of differences in political status. Re-
spondents Uintah County and Uintah County Hospital filed their 
motion for dismissal based upon the failure of Plaintiff to 
comply with specific statutory notice requirements pertaining 
to county governments and county health providers. (R., p. 145). 
After extensive argument and review of legal memoranda 
submitted by all parties, the trial court took the motions of 
defendants under advisement. The court granted the motion of 
Defendants Uintah County and Uintah County Hospital and dis-
missed Plaintiff's complaint for failure to comply with Section 
78-14-8; Section 17-15-10; and Section 63-30-13, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953. (R., pp. 219-220). It is from this Order that 
Plaintiff now appeals. (R., p. 221). 
-4-
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ARGUMENT 
As noted previously the grounds for dismissal in this 
case are both common and also peculiar to each of the defendants 
since the statutory requirements differ according to the type 
of entity involved. For this reason, therefore, Respondent 
Uintah County and Uintah County Hospital shall only address 
the statutory provisions specifically pertinent to Plaintiff's 
claim against them and shall defer discussion of other grounds 
to the remaining defendants. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISS-
ING PLAINTIFF'S ACTION AGAINST UINTAH 
COUNTY AND UINTAH COUNTY HOSPITAL FOR 
FAILING TO COMPLY WITH THE UTAH HEALTH 
CARE MALPRACTICE ACT. 
A. Plaintiff Failed to File ANY Notice Required Under 
the Act. 
The "Utah Health Care Malpractice Act" was passed by the 
Utah Legislature in 1976. Among its numerous provisions the 
Act required that a Notice of Intent be served upon a poten-
tial defendant at least 90 days prior to the commencement of 
any action against such defendant. Section 78-14-8, U.C.A. 
The Act was subsequently amended in 1979 at which time 
several changes not pertinent to this appeal were made. Since 
Defendant Uintah County Hospital had no part in the medical 
care of Plaintiff until March 12, 1977 it is clear that the 
provisions of Section 78-14-8 were applicable at the ti.me Plain-
tiff desired to commence an action against the county and the 
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hospital. 
Defendants Uintah County and Uintah County Hospital main-
tained that no valid notice was ever served upon the hospital 
since the notice which was received was not signed by the plain-
tiff nor did it state that Velma Gladys Yates would be the 
claimant. 
The statute, both in its original and amended form, clear-
ly mandates that the "plaintiff" give the required notice. 
The statute states in pertinent part: 
No malpractice action against a health care 
provider may be initiated unless and until 
the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant 
or his executor or successor, at least 90 
days prior notice of intent to commence an 
action.. .Notice may be in letter or affi-
davit form executed by the plaintiff or his 
attorney. 
Comparing this statutory requirement with the letter of 
April 7, 1978 clearly shows that Velma Yates was not the "plain-
tiff" giving the required notice. That letter stated in per-
tinent part: 
Pursuant to 78-14-8, U.C.A., notice is here-
with given that Marzine Yates, husband of 
Velma Gladys Yates, potentially is asserting 
and claiming and may commence a civil action 
for damages arising out of possible negli-
gent prescribing, negligent dispensing of 
drugs or other forms of prescribed medicine, 
and negligent hospitalization and treatment 
of his wife. 
The notice then continues to state alleged facts concern-
inc; "claimant's wife" which caused "claimant's wife" to suffer 
-6-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
injuries. The notice then concludes by noting that "claimant 
is unable to supply further information about the details of 
the possible claim." The notice is signed by Marzine Yates 
and by Robert M. McRae, "Attorney for Claimant". 
A reading of this letter unquestionably shows that the 
proposed plaintiff referred to in the notice was Marzine Yates--
not the plaintiff in this action, Velma Gladys Yates. Clearly, 
anyone reading the April 7 letter would conclude that the plain-
tiff in any subsequent action would be Marzine Yates and that 
Mr. McRae would represent him. 
The trial court in its memorandum decision noted the fail-
ure of Plaintiff to file any notice by stating: 
Plaintiff in reliance on Hatch v. Weber 
County, 23 U.2d 144, 459 P.2d 436, asserts 
that Plaintiff complied substantially with 
the notice requirement of 78-14-8, U.C.A. 
'53. Nothing in the record indicates that 
Velma Gladys Yates complied at all with the 
statutory notice requirements. Defendants' 
motions to dismiss are granted. (R., p. 
218). (Emphasis in original). 
As will be discussed in detail in the next subsection,a 
statute which is a condition precedent to the filing of an ac-
tion must be strictly complied with if a plaintiff wishes his 
or her day in court. In this case it would have been a sim-
ple matter for the April 7, 1978 letter to state that Velma 
Gladys Yates was asserting a potential claim and could be a 
plaintiff in a subsequent action. This was not done nor was 
any reason advanced by Plaintiff in the lower court for such 
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failure. 
For this reason, the trial court was correct in concluding 
that no valid notice whatsoever was ever given to Defendants 
by Plaintiff Velma Gladys Yates and the court correctly dis-
missed the action for failure to give the necessary notice. 
Vealey v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 (Utah 1978). 
B. The Notice Filed by Plaintiff's Husband was Itself 
Insufficient as a Matter of Law. 
Even if it were assumed arguendo that the April 7 notice 
filed by Plaintiff's husband was properly filed by the "plain-
tiff", the contents of the notice itself are insufficient as 
a matter of law to comply with the other requirements of Sec-
tion 78-14-8. 
The notice required to be given under the Health Care Mal-
practice Act is jurisdictional. Until such notice is given a 
District Court has no jurisdiction over a complaint filed. 
Section 78-14-8, U.C.A. (1979 Supp.) is therefore similar to 
Section 63-30-11 and Section 63-30-13, U.C.A. (1979 Supp.) which 
are contained in the Governmental Immunity Act. Statutes of 
this type are jurisdictional and the plaintiff must allege and 
prove compliance with them before an action may be maintained. 
Bowen v. Waymire, 478 P.2d 691 (Colo. App. 1970). 
Where a jurisdictional notice is required to be given in 
a certain manner any means other than that prescribed is inef-
fective. Hart v. Bayless Investment and Trading Company, 346 
-8-
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P.2d 1101 (Ariz. 1960); Lewis v. Ehrlich, 513 P.2d 153 (Ariz. 
App. 1973). 
Appellant in her brief quotes from this Court's case of 
Tooele Meat and Storage Company v. Morse, 136 P. 965 (Utah 
1913) and argues that a notice requirement should be liberally 
construed. (Appellant's brief, p. 5). Appellant, however, has 
omitted the sentence following that quoted in her brief and has 
therefore distorted the rule to be applied in the instant case. 
The entire quotation is as follows: 
The general rule in respect to notices is 
that mere informalities do not vitiate 
them so long as they do not mislead, and 
give the necessary information to the pro-
per parties. Of course, where the statute 
prescribes a particular form of notice, 
then, as a general rule, the form required 
must be followed with reasonable strictness, 
as under such circumstances the form may be 
regarded as matters of substance. But 
where the statute does not prescribe a form, 
the question ordinarily is whether the no-
tice actually given constitutes a substan-
tial compliance with the statutes. 136 P. 
at 966 (Emphasis added). 
Section 78-14-8 clearly enumerates the requirements that 
any notice must contain. The April 7 letter specifically re-
fers to this statutory section so it is evident that the draft-
er of the letter was aware of its requirements. The statute 
states the following: 
Such notice shall include the nature of the 
claim, the p~s involved, the date, time 
and place of the occurrence, the circumstances 
thereof, specific allegations of misconduct on 
the part of the prospective defendant, the na-
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ture of the alleged injuries and other dam-
ages sustained. 
The determination of whether a notice complies with a 
statute is a question of law for the court. Himes v. City of 
Flint, 196 N.W.2d 321 (Mich App. 1972). Thus, as a matter of 
law, the April 7 notice is patently inadequate to meet the 
criteria necessary for Plaintiff to successfully file an action 
against Uintah County and Uintah County Hospital. 
This is not a question of "substantial compliance" as ar-
gued by Appellant. (Appellant's brief, pp. 3-8]. Rather, it 
is a question of whether Plaintiff complied with all of the 
mandatory requirements of the notice statute. 
Comparing the statutory requirements with the April 7 
Notice, the following deficiencies are readily apparent as to 
any claim against Uintah County or Uintah County Hospital: 
a. Nature of Claim - The notice states that 
the claim may be commenced for "possible ne-
gligent prescribing, negligent dispensing of 
drugs or other forms of prescribing medicine, 
and negligent hospitalization and treatment." 
Such statement may be sufficient except that 
it fails to specify which of these acts was 
committed by Defendant Uintah County and Uintah 
Hospital. 
b. The Persons Involved - No specific personnel 
or even general description of hospital personnel 
are given in the notice. 
c. The Date, Time, and Place of the Occur-
rence - The only reference to any date in the 
letter is March, 1976 to March, 1978 tut such re-
ference refers only to prescriptions from the 
Vernal Drug Company as prescribed by Dr. Lee Bal-
ka. Absolutely no date, time or place reference 
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is made as to Defendants Uintah County or 
Uintah County Hospital. 
d. Specific Allegations of Misconduct on 
the Part of the Prospective Defendant - No 
allegations whatsoever are made as to Uintah 
County or Uintah County Hospital conduct. 
In fact, the name "Uintah County Hospital" 
does not appear anywhere in the notice. While 
some reference is made to prescribing drugs 
there is no reference that Defendant Uintah 
County Hospital was in any way connected to 
such prescribing or dispensing of drugs. 
There is no allegation whatsoever as to any 
conduct of the hospital except for the con-
clusionary statement of "negligent hospitali-
zation and treatment". 
e. Nature of the Alleged Injuries - The 
letter refers to a "seizure and subsequent 
coma" but does not allege any permanent dis-
ability as is now claimed by the plaintiff. 
This Court has repeatedly held that under the Government 
Immunity Act the notice provision must be complied with before 
a cause of action can be commenced. Edwards v. Iron County, 
531 P.2d 476 (Utah 1975; Varoz v. Sevey, 506 P.2d 435 (Vtah 
1973; and Gallegos v. Midvale City, 497 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1972). 
Moreover, in order to meet the requirements of the Govern-
mental Immunity Act the information demanded by the statutory 
language must be supplied. Scarborough v. Granite School Dis-
trict, 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975). 
The requirements of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 
are no less demanding. The statute specifically states that no 
malpractice action "may be commenced unless and until" the no-
tice is given in the correct form. Section 78-14-8. Plaintiff, 
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however, attempts to distinguish this notice requirement and 
its similarity to the Governmental Immunity Act and this 
Court's interpretations of that act. Plaintiff argues that 
prior to the enactment of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 
Plaintiff had a common law right to sue Defendant and there-
fore any statutory restriction cannot be controlling. (Appel-
lant's brief, pp. 6-7). Thus, Plaintiff argues the Governmen-
tal Immunity Act is not comparable because there was no pre-
existing right to sue a government prior to the waiver of im-
munity passed by the State Legislature. 
This argument is without merit. In Berlandi v. Union 
Freight Railroad Company, 16 N.E.2d 17 (Mass. 1938) a defendant 
moved to dismiss an action brought by a plaintiff for alle-
gedly defective railroad tracks owned by the private corporation. 
The defendants argued that notice under a statutory provision 
was required in order for a proper suit to have been commenced. 
The plaintiffs argued that since a common law right existed be-
fore the statute that such notice was not required. The Supreme 
Court of Massachusetts discussed this argument and stated: 
The plaintiffs have argued, however, that 
their actions are at common law and there-
fore that they were not required to give 
the statutory notice provided for in Section 
89. It is true that "At common law, the de-
fendant would be liable for any person in-
jured by such negligence" .•.. The statute 
is in affirmance of the common law and the 
liability declared is substantially the same 
as that which the common law imposes upon 
persons who place obstructions in the public 
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highway whereby injury is done to persons 
or property. It was enacted to relieve ci-
ties and towns from liability for injuries 
to travelers in fact caused by railways if 
notice is not given and an action begun as 
provided in Chapter 84, Section 18 ..•. Al-
though by its terms the common law liabilitY 
was affirmed, the conditions imposed in en-
forcing that liability must be observed, and 
the plaintiffs were bound to proceed under 
its terms .•.. The notice required is not 
a mere step in enforcing the plaintiff's ac-
tions, "but is a condition precedent to 
[their] existence, which in other words is 
one of [their] essential elements." Id. at 
20. 
Cases in other jurisdictions in which statutory notice 
requirements have not been fulfilled clearly indicates the 
strictness which must be applied in supplying the information 
demanded by a mandatory notice statute. In Nelson v. Dunkin, 
419 P.2d 984 (Wash. 1966) a statute required notice to be 
given to the county describing any defect causing injuries, 
a description of the injuries, the amount of damages incurred, 
and a "statement of the actual residence of the claimant at 
the time of presenting and filing the claim and for a period 
of six months immediately prior to the time the claim accrued." 
The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the lower court's 
dismissal of the action based upon the failure of the claimant 
to include in his notice the residency requirement. The court 
stated the following: 
There was absolutely no attempt to state 
the actual residence of the claimant at 
the time the claim was presented and filed; 
the only effort to meet the further require-
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ment of a statement of the actual residence 
for six months prior to the time the claim 
accrued was the above-quoted statement to the 
effect that the claimant and his son had been 
residents of the State of Alaska for a period 
of six months immediately preceding the acci-
dent. 
The purpose of the requirements, relative to 
residence, is to give the county an oppor-
tunity to investigate the claimant as well as 
his claimed injuries. 
we agree with the trial court that the quoted 
reference to the State of Alaska cannot be 
regarded as a substantial compliance with a 
request for a statement as to the actual resi-
dence at the time of presenting the claim and 
for six months preceding the accrual of the 
accident. There was no attempt to give any 
meaningful information. We need not expatiate 
on the size of Alaska; for all practical pur-
poses the claimant might just as well have 
said that they were residents on the Planet 
Earth. Id. at 985-986. (Emphasis added). 
The court then concluded by noting that statutory requirements 
must be complied with and that it is not a judicial function 
to decide whether such requirements were necessary for the 
county to investigate the claim. The court then stated: 
It is not for the court to decide whether a 
claimant's failure to comply with the statutory 
requirement relative to his claim is prejudicial 
to the county in any particular case. The le-
gislature has required certain information. If 
this requirement is no longer meaningful, it is 
for the legislature and not for this court to 
take it out of the statute. Id. at 988. 
Similarly, in Himes v. City of Flint, 196 N.W.2d 321 (Mich. 
App. 1972) the court held that a statutory notice of fire vio-
lation had not been complied with since the city had failed to 
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meet at least three of the mandatory standards prescribed by 
the ordinance. Just as in the present case, the city argued 
that the notice substantially complied with the statute and 
was adequate as a matter of law. The court rejected this argu-
ment and stated the following: 
It cannot be said from a reading of the 
notice that the mandatory contents were 
impliedly, or expressly, included therein. 
Since the directives are mandatory, the 
City Commission has determined that there 
shall be no room for administrative dis-
cretion to omit a portion of the contents 
of a notice whenever it appears to be un-
necessary in the circumstances of an indi-
vidual violation. 
The concept of "substantial compliance" 
can only be drawn upon in situations 
where the provisions of the notice are 
ambiguous. In such cases the court would 
then determine whether the notice "sub-
stantially complied" despite the ambiguity. 
However, the presently considered notice 
does not fall within this category--there 
being no language which could be construed 
as complying with the mandatory content 
requirements. Id. at 324. (Emphasis in 
the original). 
Finally, this Court in Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 134 P. 
1167 (Utah 1914) held that the purpose of the statute requiring 
notice to be given to the city for injuries (formerly Section 
10-7-77, U.C.A.) is to require every claimant to state clearly 
all of the elements of his claim to the Board of Commissioners 
or City Council for allowance as a condition precedent to his 
right to sue the city and recover his danages in an ordinary 
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action. This Court held that a notice in which damages were 
specified as "for general impairment" of an automobile was an 
insufficient description of the damages and one which could 
not be cured by amendment. See also Stoors v. City of Denver, 
73 P. 1094 (Colo. App. 1903). 
It is therefore evident that a review of the statutory 
requirement of notice as compared with the April 7 letter 
clearly omits at least four of the six essential elements re-
quired by such notice before an action may be commenced against 
Uintah County or Uintah County Hospital. As to these defendants 
there is no question of "substantial compliance" since the de-
fendants are not even mentioned in the text of the letter, no 
dates or places are described relating to the defendants, nor 
is any circumstance or allegation of specific misconduct made 
as to these defendants. As in the previously cited cases, this 
is not a question of ambiguity of a notice, but is rather a 
case where all requirements were completely omitted. 
For this reason, the statutory notice requirement of Sec-
tion 78-14-8 was not fulfilled by the plaintiff and the trial 
court properly dismissed the subsequently filed action. 
C. Any Claimed Actual Knowledge by Defendant Uintah Coun-
ty and Uintah County Hospital is Immaterial. 
Appellant argues in her brief that it is apparent that 
Section 78-14-8 was adopted "merely as a procedural device to 
insure that potential defendants receive actual notice of a 
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claim against them, and have an opportunity to resolve that 
claim prior to the filing of a complaint." (Appellant's brief, 
p. 9). Appellant then argues that since it's undisputed that 
each respondent received actual notice of the claim and had 
ample opportunity to investigate the claim the fact that the 
notice may not have been strictly complied with is not impor-
tant. Appellant finally argues that actual knowledge by Res-
pondents of a potential claim is all that is required since a 
"technical" reading of the statute would create a "stumbling 
block for unwary plaintiffs." (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-11). 
This argument is without merit. Had the legislature only 
intended that notice of a potential claim be given to a health 
care provider it would have been a simple matter for the sta-
tute to merely state that notice of intent should be so provi-
ded. Instead, however, the legislature expressly and in sub-
stantial detail outlined the notice requirements. The legisla-
ture obviously felt that such information was essential in order 
to provide the health care recipient with enough information 
to conduct an investigation and to possibly enter into a settle-
ment with the claimant. It is not the prerogative of Plaintiff 
to say that such required information was only a "technicality" 
and that the mere act of notifying the health care provider 
of a possible claim was sufficient. 
This Court has on several occasions held that actual know-
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ledge by County employees under the Governmental Immunity Act 
is not sufficient to dispense with the requirement of filing 
a properly executed notice of claim. Edwards v. Iron County, 
531 P.2d 476 (Utah 1975); Scarborough v. Granite School Dis-
trict, 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975); Varoz v. Sevey, 506 P.2d 435 
(Utah 19731. 
In Nelson v. Dunkin, 419 P.2d 984 (Wash. 1966) a similar 
argument was advanced by that plaintiff in a governmental 
immunity action. In that case the plaintiff failed to supply 
information concerning his residency at the time the accident 
occurred. The court there stated the following: 
IT]he very appealing argument is made that 
in this particular situation the county 
was not in any way prejudiced by not having 
this information. The boy, Lewis Gordon 
Nelson, was in a hospital in Whatcom Coun-
ty. The County Coroner, and presumably the 
sheriff, had made a complete investigation 
of all facts relative to the collision; 
and the avenues of the interrogatories and 
depositions were available and the County 
had availed itself of the former. 
The answer to this argument is that the in-
formation required is for the County's con-
sideration of the claim. There can be no 
interrogatories and depositions until the 
county has rejected the claim and an action 
has been commenced. Id. at 986. 
Obviously, the purpose of Section 78-14-8 was to provide 
time for a health care provider to investigate an alleged claim 
and to allow the health care provider the opportunity to settle 
such claim before a court proceeding has been filed in order 
to avoid adverse publicity. The intent was not to merely no-
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tify the health care provider that a claim may be asserted but 
was to provide sufficient and substantial information to such 
health care provider that a thorough and adequate investiga-
tion could be made. 
Appellant's argument would require a health care provider 
to be left at the mercy of the claimant as to the amount of 
information which it is given or as to how knowledge of the 
claim is obtained. Just as with the Government Immunity Act, 
the purpose of the written notice is to prevent any dispute 
from arising as to when notice was received while at the same 
time providing essential information necessary for the purpose 
of investigation. 
The notice statute of the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act is not a "technical stumbling block" for an "unwary plain-
tiff." The statute is clearly written and simply requires a 
notice to be served 90 days prior to the commencement of an 
action which contains six simple and common types of informa-
tion which any plaintiff should readily be able to supply. In 
this case, the notice was prepared upon the stationery of an 
attorney. It is certainly not unreasonable to expect a prac-
ticing Utah attorney to be able to comply with the straight 
forward requirements of this statutory mandate. 
For these reasons, any actual knowledge of Plaintiff's 
claim by Defendant Uintah County or Uintah County Hospital is 
immaterial and the trial court correctly dismissed Plaintiff's 
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complaint for failure to comply with the mandatory notice re-
quirement. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISS-
ING PLAINTIFF'S ACTION AGAINST UINTAH 
COUNTY AND UINTAH COUNTY HOSPITAL FOR 
FAILING TO COMPLY WITH THE UTAH GOVERN-
MENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that Uintah County Hospital 
is owned and operated by Uintah County. (R., p. 11. Defen-
dants admitted in their answer to this fact. (R., p. 22). 
Defendants Uintah County and Uintah County Hospital 
claimed at the trial court level that Plaintiff had failed to 
comply with the Governmental Immunity Act by not filing a No-
tice of Claim with the County Commission as required by Section 
63-30-11 and 63-30-13. 
Plaintiff responded to this argument by claiming that this 
Court's case of Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 
1975) held that the operation of a hospital was a proprietary 
function and therefore was not within the Governmental Immunity 
Act. (R., p. 209). The Greenhaugh decision was based upon an 
interpretation of Section 63-30-3, U.C.A., 1953 which stated 
that the Governmental Immunity Act only applied to activities 
involving governmental functions. This Court held that since 
the operation of the hospital was a proprietary function the 
procedures of the Governmental Immunity Act were not applicable 
since a direct action could be maintained against the city 
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without a waiver of immunity. 
Apparently in direct response to the Greenhaugh decision 
the Utah legislature in 1978 amended Section 63-30-3 to include 
hospital operated facilities within the procedure of the act. 
The amended statute reads as follows: 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
Act, all governmental entities are immune 
from suit for any injury which results from 
the exercise of a governmental function, 
governmentally owned hospital, nursing home, 
or other governmental health care facility. 
Section 63-30-3. (Supp. 1979). 
Appellant has apparently recognized this amendment since 
she has failed to claim the proprietary distinction in her 
brief. Presumably, therefore, Appellant has conceded that the 
Governmental Immunity Act is applicable and that the notice 
provisions of Section 63-30-11 and 63-30-13 must be followed. 
(See Appellant's brief, pp. 12-13 discussing these notice pro-
visions). 
ing: 
Section 63-30-13, as amended in 1978, states the follow-
Claim Against Political Subdivision--Time 
for Filing Notice. - A claim against a poli-
tical subdivision is barred unless notice of 
claim is filed with the governing body of 
the political subdivision within one year 
after the cause of action arises. (Emphasis 
added). 
Appellant argues that the April 7, 1978 letter was suffi-
cient to satisfy the requirements of Section 63-30-11. (Appel-
lant's brief, p. 12). It is unnecessary, however, to discuss 
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the content of this letter with reference to the Goverrunental 
Inununity Act since it is undisputed that the April 7, 1978 
letter was never filed with the Uintah County Commission--the 
governing body of Uintah County. 
This Court has held in Scarborough v. Granite School Dis-
trict, 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975) that a necessary element of 
the statute is that the notice "be directed to and delivered 
to someone authorized to or responsible for receiving it." 
The failure of Plaintiff to file any notice with the Uintah 
County Commission clearly fails to meet the requirement of Sec-
tion 63-30-11. As such, the trial court was correct in con-
eluding that the requisite notice had not been given to the 
governing board of Uintah County and therefore a civil suit 
was barred. 
As a final note, Appellant has argued that the time for 
filing such notice is tolled because of the alleged mental dis-
ability of the plaintiff and because of this Court's decision 
in Scott v. School Board of Granite School District, 568 P.2d 
746 (1977). (Appellant's brief, pp. 14-15). 
Once again, however, the plaintiff has failed to note 
that the legislature has amended Section 63-30-11 which in ef-
feet has overruled the Scott decision. 
ing: 
Paragraph 3 of Amended Section 63-30-11 states the follow-
If the claimant is under the age of majority, 
or mentally incompetent and without a legal 
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guardian, or in prison at the time the cause 
of action accrued, the court, in its discre-
tion, may extend the time for service of notice 
of claim, but in no event shall it grant an 
extension which exceeds the general statutory 
period of limitation applicable to the cause of 
action. In determining whether to grant an ex-
tension, the court shall consider whether the 
delay in serving the notice of claim will sub-
stantially prejudice the governmental entity 
in maintaining its defense on the merits. 
Thus, the amended statute requires an order from the court 
before any tolling can occur as to the service of notice of 
claim. In this case, no such request was made to the court 
nor has it ever been judicially determined that Plaintiff was 
incompetent at the time the cause of action accrued. 
For this reason the one-year time limitation prescribed 
by the statute has expired and Plaintiff is therefore barred 
from attempting to file a new notice of claim arising from her 
treatment at the Uintah County Hospital in 1977. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISS-
ING PLAINTIFF'S ACTION AGAINST UINTAH 
COUNTY AND UINTAH COUNTY HOSPITAL FOR FAIL-
ING TO FILE NOTICE OF THE CLAIM WITH THE 
UINTAH COUNTY AUDITOR AS REQUIRED BY SEC-
TION 17-15-10, U.C.A. 
As a third alternative ground for dismissal the trial court 
found that Plaintiff had failed to file a claim pursuant to 
Section 17-15-10, U.C.A., 1953. This statute states in pertin-
ent part the following: 
The Board of County Commissioners shall 
not hear or consider any claim of any per-
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son against the county ... unless the same 
is itemized, giving names, dates and parti-
cular services rendered, or until it has 
been passed upon by the county auditor .... 
Every claim against the county must be pre-
sented to the County Auditor within a year 
after the last item of the account or claim 
accrued .. 
It is undisputed that no type of notice or claim was ever 
filed with the Uintah County Auditor. (See Affidavit of Morris 
R. Cook, Uintah County Auditor, R., p. 203). 
This Court in Edwards v. Iron County, 531 P.2d 476 (Utah 
1975) held that in an action brought against a county-owned 
hospital for alleged malpractice it was necessary for the plain-
tiff to file a timely claim under the provisions of Section 
17-15-10. The facts in that case as to the claim asserted were 
nearly identical to the claim now asserted by Plaintiff. 
Appellant argues, however, that Section 17-15-10 is no 
longer applicable because of the enactment of the Utah Govern-
mental Immunity Act. (Appellant's brief, pp. 11-12). Plain-
tiff asserts, therefore, that the Governmental Immunity Act 
preempts the county claim statute and eliminates the need for 
filing under it. 
This argument is not valid. The original Governmental 
Immunity Act passed in 1965 provided for only a 90-day period 
of notice and also stated that any claim against a city was to 
be governed by Section 10-7-77, U.C.A. which provided a 30-day 
notice requirement. This latter section was the city equiva-
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lent of the county 17-15-10 section. 
In 1975 this Court's decision in Edwards was decided. 
The legislature was thus fully aware that this Court required 
a filing under Section 17-15-10 in cases involving malpractice 
against the county. 
In 1978 the legislature repealed Section 10-7-77 (the 
city claim statute) and amended Section 63-30-13 to delete the 
reference to the previous city statute. (U.C.A. 1979 Supp.). 
However, the legislature did not repeal or amend Section 
17-15-10 pertaining to claims against the county. It is ap-
parent that had the legislature intended for the Utah Govern-
mental Immunity Act to preempt Section 17-15-10 it would have 
amended the latter statute at the same time the city statute 
was abolished and the Governmental Immunity Statute was revised. 
In absence of such revocation or amendment Section 17-15-10 
is still viable law and still requires a claim be submitted to 
the county auditor before a suit can be commenced. 
Certainly, Plaintiff's attorney should have been aware of 
this statute and its requirement since he was a named plain-
tiff in the case of Hatch v. Weber County, 459 P.2d 436 (Utah 
1969) involving an interpretation of Section 17-15-10. 
In any event, Plaintiff and her attorney failed to cor-
rectly file a Notice of Claim under either the Governmental 
Immunity Act or the County Claim Act and therefore the trial 
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court correctly dismissed the complaint under either or both 
of these provisions. 
POINT IV 
THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT AND HEALTH 
CARE PRACTICE ACT ARE CONSTITUTIONAL. 
Appellant asserts two final arguments in her brief. First, 
that the notice section 63-30-11 of the Utah Governmental Im-
munity Act is unconstitutional and second that the notice pro-
vision Section 78-14-8 of the Health Care Malpractice Act is 
also unconstitutional. Both of these arguments are without me· 
rit. 
Appellant has failed to raise the question of constitu-
tionality of the Governmental Immunity Act at the lower trial 
level. This Court has held that a defendant cannot raise an 
issue for the first time on appeal. Neilson v. Eisen, 209 P.2d 
928 (1949); Wagner v. Olson, 482 P.2d 702 (1971). This rule 
was recently reaffirmed in State of Utah v. Daniel Lee Laird, 
No. 16318 (Utah, October 11, 1979). 
Even if this issue were properly before this Court it can-
not stand. Since a suit against the government is discretion-
ary with the legislature it can impose those conditions it 
deems necessary before such suit can be commenced. Cornwall 
v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925 (Utah 1977). There are numerous rea-
sons why a government entity should be entitled to notice before 
a suit can be commenced against it. See discussion in Gallegos 
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v. Midvale City, 492 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1972). 
This Court in Crowder v. Salt Lake County, 552 P.2d 646 
(Utah 1976) has upheld the notice provision of the Governmen-
tal Immunity Act as constitutional even though at that time 
three different time periods existed depending upon the govern-
mental entity sued. This Court noted: 
While no precise formula has been enuncia-
ted, it is generally held that the legis-
lature has a wide discretion in enacting 
laws which affect one group of citizens 
differently than other groups. The consti-
tutional safeguard of equal protection is 
offended only if the classification rests 
upon a ground not relative to the State's 
objective. The legislature is presumed to 
have acted within their constitutional au-
thority even though inequality results. 
Id. at 647. 
Likewise, the fact that a notice provision is required 
under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act and is not required 
as to other tort feasors does not make such Act unconstitutional. 
This Court in McGuire v. University of Utah Medical Cen-
ter, No. 15984 (Utah, November 1, 1979) held that the 1979 
amendment to Section 78-14-8 did not constitute special legis-
lation since it applied to a class of persons equally--in that 
case, all persons having a cause of action arising prior to 
the effective date of the malpractice act. This Court noted: 
The amendment does not rest on an arbi-
trary classification; it makes no invi-
dious discrimination, and it applies uni-
formly to all within the class. The 
amendment merely differentiates between 
those classes of persons to whom the no-
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tice of intent to sue provision applies 
and those to whom it does not apply based 
on the effective date of the Malpractice 
Act. It is within the power of the Legis-
lature to make such a classification when 
enacting clarifying legislation designed 
to avoid hardship and injustice. Slip 
opinion at p. 4. 
The fact that some plaintiffs must file a Notice of Intent 
against alleged tort feasors and that others do not does not 
make the law unconstitutional. The law is equally applied to 
all persons within the class claiming injuries sustained by a 
health care provider. As previously noted, the legislature 
may validly divide large classes of people into smaller clas-
ses without infringing upon constitutional safeguards. 
Plaintiff argues in her brief that "It must be shown a 
medical malpractice crisis does in fact exist in Utah, that a 
classification based upon the lines of health care providers 
and non-health care providers is not arbitrary, and that the 
legislation does in fact reduce the number and amount of medi-
cal malpractice awards." (Appellant's brief, p. 20). 
It is the burden, however, of Appellant to shew that an 
invalid classification has occurred and not the burden of the 
legislature to show that such classification is valid. Crowder 
v. Salt Lake County, 552 P.2d 646 (Utah 1976). 
The legislature has previously made "legislative findings 
and declarations" as contained in Section 78-14-2 of the Act 
itself. These findings on their face support and justify the 
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requirement that claimants against health care providers must 
follow a more stringent procedure than claimants against non-
heal th care providers. The facts listed in this section in-
clude the high number of lawsuits, the high cost of medical 
insurance, the difficulty in obtaining insurance, and the pur-
pose of encouraging private insurance companies to continue 
to provide malpractice insurance while establishing a mechan-
ism to insure the availability of insurance. These are all 
legitimate purposes and goals of the legislature. 
Hence, in the absence of proof to the contrary the classi-
fication made by the legislature is reasonable and is consti-
tutionally sound. 
For these reasons, both the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act and the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act are constitutionally 
valid and are applicable to Plaintiff's claim against Uintah 
County and Uintah County Hospital. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court was correct in dismissing Plaintiff's claim 
for failure to comply with the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. 
It is evident from examining the April 7 notice that Plaintiff 
is not listed as a claimant which is a mandatory requirement of 
the Act. 
In addition, the notice itself is defective since it fails 
to give Uintah County or Uintah County Hospital the mandatory 
information required by the statute. This failure is not nega-
ted by any alleged actual knowledge of the circumstances of 
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Plaintiff's claim on the part of the hospital or county. 
In addition, Plaintiff failed to comply with the mandatory 
notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act by failing 
to file such notice with the governing body of Uintah County. 
The plaintiff also failed to file a claim with the county audi-
tor as is required by Section 17-15-10, U.C.A. 
Finally, both the Governmental Immunity Act and Health 
Care Practice Act are constitutional. Both of these acts were 
passed by the Utah Legislature because of the special needs and 
status encompassing governmental entities and health care pro-
viders. The classification under both of these acts is well 
within the power of the legislature and all persons asserting 
claims against governmental entities for health care providers 
must follow the same statutory requirements. The fact that 
these requirements are more stringent than claims against other 
entities is immaterial as long as a legitimate basis for classi· 
fica tion exists. 
For these reasons, the judgment of the lower court dis-
missing Plaintiff's complaint should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
1) 
::-.~~~ l;;ii:;:.,~=---
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Respondents Uintah 
County and Uintah County Hospita; 
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of Respondents Uintah County and Uintah County Hospital, pos-
tage prepaid, this ~day of January, 1980 to the following: 
Robert M. McRae, 72 East 4th South #355, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111; William T. Evans, 25 South Wolcott, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84112; John H. Snow, 700 Continental Bank Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101; D. Gary Christian, 600 Commercial 
Club Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; and Gayle F. 
McKeachnie, 53 South 200 East, Vernal, Utah 84078. 
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